Fiscal Effects of Reforming Local Constitutions
研究了1990年代德国各州修改地方宪法、引入市长直选和直接民主元素对地方财政政策的影响，发现市长直选降低了政府支出，而直接民主元素则增加了支出，结果与瑞士和美国不同。
Most German states amended their local constitutions during the 1990s and now allow for the direct election of mayors, initiatives and referendums, and vote aggregation, as well as vote splitting. In this paper, it is asked whether these reforms had any effects on local fiscal policies. It is shown that the direct election of mayors led to lower government spending, whereas the introduction of direct democratic elements led to higher expenditures. The empirical results concerning direct democracy are substantially different from findings in relation to both Switzerland and the US. It is argued that this difference may be due to a lack of fiscal referendums in Germany.