Accounting Information in Financial Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective
回顾了与会计研究者相关的金融合同理论和实证研究，讨论会计信息如何提升合同效率，并指出不完全合同理论能加深对会计信息作用机制的理解，为未来研究提供方向。
ABSTRACT This paper reviews theoretical and empirical work on financial contracting that is relevant to accounting researchers. Its primary objective is to discuss how the use of accounting information in contracts enhances contracting efficiency and to suggest avenues for future research. We argue that incomplete contract theory broadens our understanding of both the role accounting information plays in contracting and the mechanisms through which efficiency gains are achieved. By discussing its rich theoretical implications, we expect incomplete contract theory to prove useful in motivating future research and in offering directions to advance our knowledge of how accounting information affects contract efficiency.