Auction design without quasilinear preferences
研究了无拟线性偏好假设下的私人价值拍卖模型，发现拍卖人可通过概率需求机制将不可分割商品以概率形式分配，从而获得比标准拍卖更高的期望收入，并在完全信息下实现帕累托有效配置。
I study the canonical private value auction model for a single good without the quasilinearity restriction. I assume only that bidders are risk averse and the indivisible good for sale is a normal good. I show that removing quasilinearity leads to qualitatively different solutions to the auction design problem. Expected revenue is no longer maximized using standard auctions that allocate the good to the highest bidder. Instead, the auctioneer better exploits bidder preferences by using a mechanism that allocates the good to one of many different bidders, each with strictly positive probability. I introduce a probability demand mechanism that treats probabilities of winning the indivisible good like a d ivisible good in net supply 1. With enough bidders, it has greater expected revenues than any standard auction, and under complete information, it implements a Pareto efficient allocation.