POLITICAL OPPORTUNISM AND COUNTERCYCLICAL FISCAL POLICY IN ELECTION‐YEAR RECESSIONS
研究了经济衰退如何影响政治预算周期，发现葡萄牙地方政府在选举年预期衰退时会大幅增加预算赤字，这源于机会主义动机而非凯恩斯主义。
Political budget cycles (PBCs) have been well documented in the literature, albeit not for all circumstances. Similarly, there is clear evidence on the positive effect of economic growth on electoral success. However, no work has been done on the impact of economic growth on the magnitude of PBCs. The theoretical model argues that a government has an incentive to increase fiscal manipulations when a recession is expected to hit and curtail reelection chances; this amounts to countercyclical policy for opportunistic rather than Keynesian motives. Very robust evidence for this behavior is found in Portuguese municipalities; in election years, budget deficits go up even more and significantly so, when a recession is expected.