WELFARE ANALYSIS OF THE VEHICLE QUOTA SYSTEM IN CHINA
分析了上海车辆配额制度对福利的影响，发现该制度既因减少交易造成福利损失，又因降低汽车消费外部性带来福利增益，净效果取决于外部性影子价格、车辆寿命假设和消费者偏好。
This article presents a welfare analysis of the vehicle quota system of Shanghai, China. The empirical findings suggest that the quota system leads to both welfare loss as a result of reduction in vehicle transactions and welfare gain because of less externality of auto consumption. The net effect depends on the shadow price of the marginal externality, the assumption of vehicle lifetime, and market conditions such as consumers' intrinsic preference for vehicles. Compared to a progressive tax system, the quota system is less effective in vehicle control but more efficient in improving social welfare.