Resale Price Maintenance with Secret Contracts and Retail Service Externalities
研究垄断制造商通过零售商销售时，秘密合同下转售价格维持对价格、服务水平和消费者福利的影响，发现行业性价格下限会损害消费者。
We analyze a setting where a monopolist sells through retailers that set prices and provide valuable but non-contractible services to customers. We assume that contracts are private. We find that purely bilateral price restraints have no effect on the equilibrium outcome and that the standard Bertrand prices and service levels prevail. We also show that if manufacturers can commit to industry-wide resale prices, they can obtain higher prices and service levels but will generally not be able to achieve the fully integrated outcome. Using a specific linear demand system, we find that industry-wide price floors are harmful to consumers.