Contract Design with Information Asymmetry in a Supply Chain under an Emissions Trading Mechanism
研究了一个制造商和多个供应商在排放交易机制下的采购合同设计问题，分析了不同拍卖类型（绿色度拍卖、价格拍卖、绩效拍卖）对最优订货量和收益的影响，为制造商和供应商提供决策支持。
ABSTRACT We aim to design an appropriate sourcing mechanism with information asymmetry in a supply chain with one manufacturer and multiple suppliers subject to an emissions trading scheme. The manufacturer purchases raw materials from suppliers, who hold private information regarding the green degree—that is, the unit emission rates—of their raw materials. An appropriate strategy must be adopted by the manufacturer for the contract design, including a series of payments and the order quantities; the suppliers are subsequently invited to bid for the contracts. The basic model is formulated to assist the manufacturer in designing a reasonable contract for a single supplier. The characteristics of the optimal order quantity and payoff functions of both the manufacturer and supplier are analyzed. A competitive procurement scenario with multiple suppliers is also discussed. With respect to the diversity of auctions, three different auction types are analyzed, including a green degree auction, a price auction with emissions targets, and a performance‐based auction. In addition, an efficient emissions trading policy is established to guide manufacturers regarding how to balance their emission allowances based on the optimal order quantities. Our approach provides an effective decision support system for both the manufacturer and suppliers.