Incentives for Quality in Friendly and Hostile Informational Environments
研究了在偏向性信息披露下，质量投入的激励问题。定义了友好环境（披露概率随质量提高）和敌对环境（相反），发现敌对环境在成本低、监控资源高时能产生更强的质量激励。
We develop a model of costly quality provision under biased disclosure. We define as friendly an environment in which the disclosure probability increases with quality, and as hostile an environment in which the opposite holds. Hostile environments produce a positive externality among sellers and potentially multiple equilibria. In contrast, friendly environments always yield a unique equilibrium. We establish that the environment that maximizes quality generates signals contradicting buyers' expectations. Hence, hostility produces greater incentives for quality than friendliness when costs are low and monitoring resources high.