Enhancing Loan Quality Through Transparency: Evidence from the European Central Bank Loan Level Reporting Initiative
利用欧洲央行2013年要求银行按标准格式报告证券化贷款信息的政策，研究发现透明度提升后，证券化贷款的违约概率、逾期金额和损失均显著降低，且对信息收集更密集或市场约束更强的银行效果更明显。
ABSTRACT We explore whether transparency in banks’ securitization activities enhances loan quality. We take advantage of a novel disclosure initiative introduced by the European Central Bank, which requires, as of January 2013, banks that use their asset‐backed securities as collateral for repo financing to report securitized loan characteristics and performance in a standardized format. We find that securitized loans originated under the transparency regime are of better quality with a lower default probability, a lower delinquent amount, fewer days in delinquency, and lower losses upon default. Additionally, banks with more intensive loan level information collection and those operating under stronger market discipline experience greater improvement in their loan quality under the new reporting standards. Overall, we demonstrate that greater transparency has real effects by incentivizing banks to improve their credit practices.