How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree
研究1956年针对贝尔公司的反垄断同意令，强制其免费许可所有现有专利，发现这促进了电信以外市场的后续创新，但对电信领域影响有限。
Is compulsory licensing an effective antitrust remedy to increase innovation? To answer this question, we analyze the 1956 consent decree that settled an antitrust lawsuit against Bell, a vertically integrated monopolist charged with foreclosing the telecommunications equipment market. Bell was forced to license all its existing patents royalty-free, including those not related to telecommunications. We identify the effect of the consent decree on follow-on innovations building on Bell patents by using exactly matched non-Bell patents as control group. We show that the consent decree led to a lasting increase in innovation but only in markets outside the telecommunications sector.