Petro Rents, Political Institutions, and Hidden Wealth: Evidence from Offshore Bank Accounts
利用离岸金融中心的独特存款数据，研究石油租金如何转化为隐藏财富，发现制度约束薄弱时，约15%的石油收入被转入秘密账户。
Do political institutions limit rent seeking by politicians? We study the transformation of petroleum rents, almost universally under direct government control, into hidden wealth using unique data on bank deposits in offshore financial centers that specialize in secrecy and asset protection. Our main finding is that plausibly exogenous shocks to petroleum income are associated with significant increases in hidden wealth, but only when institutional checks and balances are weak. The results suggest that around 15% of the windfall gains accruing to petroleum-producing countries with autocratic rulers is diverted to secret accounts. We find very limited evidence that shocks to other types of income not directly controlled by governments affect hidden wealth.