Quality Information and Procurement Auction Outcomes: Evidence from a Payment for Ecosystem Services Laboratory Experiment
通过实验室实验，研究了在保护拍卖中，卖方获取生态系统服务质量信息对拍卖效率的影响，发现提供信息能帮助卖方提交更高质量的保护行动，抵消信息租金带来的效率损失。
Abstract Procuring agencies in conservation auctions typically have more information about the ecosystem service (ES) quality of conservation actions than landowners and can affect auction outcomes by controlling participants’ access to this information. Our induced‐value laboratory auction experiment explores the impact of sellers’ access to ES‐quality information on auction efficiency when the conservation action choice is endogenous to offer formation. We find that providing ES‐quality information allows sellers to identify and submit higher‐quality conservation actions, an effect that counteracts previously identified efficiency losses from information rents.