Investment in concealable information by biased experts
研究了有偏专家（可能立场对立）策略性地获取成本高昂的信息，并可选择隐藏或披露，发现当专家对决策者信念有线性偏好时，信息获取决策是战略替代的，决策者可能更愿只咨询一位有偏专家。
We study a persuasion game in which biased—possibly opposed—experts strategically acquire costly information that they can then conceal or reveal. We show that information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes when experts have linear preferences over a decision maker's beliefs. The logic turns on how each expert expects the decision maker's posterior to be affected by the presence of other experts should he not acquire information that would turn out to be favorable. The decision maker may prefer to solicit advice from just one biased expert even when others—including those biased in the opposite direction (singular)—are available.