Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Delays in Renegotiations and Risk Averse Creditors
研究发现债权人经济繁荣时，主权债务重组谈判更易延迟且减记幅度更小，并通过理论模型和数据分析解释了这一现象。
Abstract Foreign creditors’ business cycles influence both the process and the outcome of sovereign debt restructurings. We compile two datasets on creditor committees and chairs and on creditor business and financial cycles at the restructurings. We find that when creditors experience high GDP growth, restructurings are delayed and settled with smaller haircuts. To rationalize these stylized facts, we develop a theoretical model of sovereign debt with multiround renegotiations between a risk averse sovereign debtor and a risk averse creditor. The quantitative analysis of the model shows that high creditor income results in both longer delays in renegotiations and smaller haircuts. Our theoretical predictions are supported by data.