The ‘Mixed’ Constituent Legitimacy of the European Federation
本文从民主理论视角批评哈贝马斯的联邦制宪权观点，认为其未能充分证明成员国制宪权的持续存在，并错误地将它们的防御功能具体化。
Abstract Constitutional lawyers and political scientists have described the European Union as a federation of states ( fédération , Bund ). They deny that federations generate a new union‐wide constituent authority besides the pouvoirs constituants of the member states. Habermas argues that federative constituent power lies with individuals in their dual roles as citizens of the several states and as citizens of the Union. I argue that from the perspective of democratic theory, this view is methodologically superior to other ‘dualist’ views of federative constituent power (J. Cohen), but go on to criticize it in two respects. It gives insufficient justification for the persistence of domestic pouvoirs constituants, and it reifies their defensive function.