Matching to Share Risk without Commitment
研究无摩擦市场中双方配对分担风险时，有限承诺如何影响匹配模式。发现当转移支付不依赖历史冲击时，更风险厌恶的代理人能承诺更大转移；在足够大的异质性风险和未来贴现下，匹配呈正选型，与完全承诺不同。
This paper studies the effect of limited commitment on sorting when two sides of a frictionless market form pairs to share risk. On each side, agents are identical except for their risk preferences. First, we provide analytical results when transfers do not condition on the history of shocks. More risk-averse agents can commit to larger transfers, as long as their consumption is less risky than their endowment. With sufficiently large idiosyncratic risk and sufficient discounting of the future, matching is positive assortative, unlike under full commitment. Second, we find positive-assortative stable matchings when transfers are history dependent using a numerical algorithm.