Stimulating the Vote: ARRA Road Spending and Vote Share
利用准实验设计和新泽西州ARRA道路项目分布，发现高速公路和桥梁支出使民主党总统得票率提高约1.5个百分点，且证据不支持经济乘数机制。
This paper estimates the impact of public good spending on voting behavior in the United States, using a quasi-experimental design and the distribution of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) road projects in New Jersey. I find an approximate 1.5 percentage point increase in Democratic Party presidential vote share in areas close to highway and bridge expenditures. I consider two alternative mechanisms: one, a salience mechanism whereby spending and associated “funded-by” signage affect political preferences; the other, a possible political multiplier effect whereby stimulus spending improves local economic outcomes, generating incumbent votes. Evidence is inconsistent with the later explanation.