Is Japan Really a “Buy”? The Corporate Governance, Cash Holdings and Economic Performance of Japanese Companies
研究日本2000年后的治理改革是否改善了企业的现金管理、经济绩效和估值，发现改革后企业现金减少、股东回报增加，绩效提升与减少超额现金、降低银行影响、增加管理层和外资持股相关。
Abstract We investigate whether Japan's much‐touted governance reforms improve its firms’ management of cash, economic performance and valuation. Consistent with an improvement in governance since 2000, Japanese firms hold less cash and increase payouts to shareholders. Improvements in performance are associated with reductions in (excess) cash, reductions in the influence of the banks that traditionally sit at the center of horizontal keiretsu , and increases in the holdings of management and foreign investors. The market valuation of Japanese firms’ cash holdings was lower than for US firms during the 1990s but increased to levels closer to those of US firms in the 2000s. Collectively, the evidence suggests that performance improves in those Japanese companies that reform their governance practices. These findings have implications for other Asian economies, such as China, India and Korea, where there are ongoing discussions of whether improved governance can increase firm performance and valuation.