The Filibuster as a War of Attrition
提出一个连续时间、双边不完全信息博弈模型，论证冗长辩论能传递参与者对议题斗争意愿的信息，并用新估计方法发现历史上及当前冗长辩论仍具有信息传递功能，同时解释了其频率和时长的变化。
Contrary to popular claims, we argue that the filibuster conveys meaningful information about participants’ willingness to fight for an issue. To this end, we present a model of the filibuster as a continuous-time, two-sided game of incomplete information and derive predictions about the frequency and hazards of observed filibusters. We show that informative signaling in the model can be detected by the presence of a specific mixture over distinct duration processes. Using a new estimator consistent with these predictions, we find that the filibuster has historically conveyed information and that it continues to do so, counter to many claims. In addition, the model explains variations in the frequency and duration of filibusters, including the puzzling increase in filibustering after rule changes easing the adoption of cloture.