The Effectiveness of Consumption Taxes and Transfers as Insurance Against Idiosyncratic Risk
使用异质性代理人模型，定量评估了消费税和一次性转移支付计划作为应对个体收入风险保险的有效性，发现其保险效果较弱，扩大计划会提高资本产出比并略微降低消费不平等。
Abstract We quantitatively evaluate the effectiveness of a consumption tax and lump‐sum transfer program as insurance against idiosyncratic earnings risk. We use a heterogeneous agent, incomplete markets model in which households adjust savings and employment in each period in the presence of idiosyncratic productivity risk and a borrowing constraint. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy. We find a weak insurance effect of the consumption tax and transfer program. Expanding the tax and transfer program from the current U.S. level increases the capital‐output ratio and reduces the interest rate. Consumption inequality also decreases only slightly.