Popularity shocks and political selection
研究发现审计报告披露地方官员滥用联邦资金的情况会影响候选人类型：低腐败时政党推选教育程度较低的候选人，高腐败时则推选教育程度较高的候选人，且媒体可及性强化这一效应。
We observe that popularity shocks are crucial for electoral accountability beyond their effects on voters’ behaviors. By focusing on Brazilian politics, we show that the disclosure of audit reports on the (mis)use of federal funds by local administrators affects the type of candidates who stand for election. When the audit finds low levels of corruption, the parties supporting the incumbent select less-educated candidates. On the contrary, parties pick more-educated candidates when the audit reveals a high level of corruption. These effects are stronger in municipalities that have easier access to local media.