PATENT BREADTH IN AN INTERNATIONAL SETTING
研究两个国家政府策略性设定专利宽度的博弈均衡，发现专利宽度对静态效率的影响非单调；在仅北方能创新的南北模型中，专利宽度协调降低福利，而双方都能创新时协调至较窄宽度可能提升全球福利。
We examine the Nash equilibria of a game where two national governments set patent breadth strategically. Broader patents make R&D more attractive, but the effect on static efficiency is nonmonotonic. In a North–South model, where only the North can innovate, harmonization of patent breadth lowers welfare relative to the Nash equilibrium. When both countries can innovate, harmonization toward narrower patent breadth may raise world welfare.