社会最优的家庭食物浪费:税收与政府激励

Social‐Optimal Household Food Waste: Taxes and Government Incentives

American Journal of Agricultural Economics · 2017
被引 57
人大 AABS 3

中文导读

建立家庭食物浪费的理论基础,推导社会最优的垃圾税和政府激励,揭示食物不安全与环境外部成本之间的关联。

Abstract

In 2010, 21% of the total food available for consumption in the United States was wasted at the household level. In response to this waste, a number of counties and U.S. localities have instituted policies (disposal taxes) directed toward reducing this waste. However, currently there is no federal food‐waste disposal tax. The aim of this paper is to establish a theoretical foundation for household food waste, and based on this theory, to determine the social‐optimal food‐waste (disposal) tax, along with a government incentive. The theory unravels the interrelation between social food insecurity and external environmental costs, which is not generally considered by households when they waste food. A social‐optimal disposal tax and government incentive involve Pigovian mechanisms and governmental expenditures. For a zero level of food waste, the social‐optimal disposable tax and government incentive approach infinity.

家庭食物浪费最优处置税政府激励庇古税