Horizontal subcontracting and investment in idle dispatchable power plants
研究了电力企业间的横向分包如何通过闲置产能防止被套牢，从而降低合同成本，并指出分散化投资激励可减少集中供电安全措施的需求。
We analyze horizontal subcontracting and show how idle production facilities can reduce contracting costs by credibly protecting against hold-up. Our analysis contributes to understanding competition between power firms that increasingly use intermittent generation sources. Their unilateral incentives to invest in maintaining underused units, such as dispatchable gas-fired plants, are underrated by plant profitability indicators. From a policy perspective, decentralized strategic investment incentives reduce the possible need for centralized security of supply measures. Our welfare analysis indicates that quantity competition can lead to a lower market-clearing price than price competition.