Horizontal coordination in federal political systems – non-centralization in the European Union and Canada compared
本文通过比较联邦制方法，研究联邦政治体系中横向协调如何实现，提出非中央集权可能发生在资源损失未被联邦权力补偿时，并应用于加拿大省际贸易和欧盟经济治理案例。
Using a comparative federalist approach, the main objective of this article is to understand how horizontal coordination in federal political systems is likely to materialize. Starting from the notion of ‘shared rule’, the article argues that ‘non-centralization’ may occur in a given policy area when the loss of resources at the constituent unit level is not compensated with an equivalent increase in federal powers. In the meantime, horizontal interdependence as well as vertical independence are facilitated through different incentives. The combination of these two factors leads to horizontal coordination where federal actors come to play a different role. The analytical framework advanced in the article is applied to two different cases, the Canadian inter-provincial trade, and the EU’s economic governance framework.