Growth and inequality in public good provision
通过动态公共品博弈实验，研究内生增长与不平等如何影响合作，发现惩罚机制反而可能降低财富，且早期不平等与后期群体收入负相关。
In a novel experimental design, we study public good games with dynamic interdependencies, where each \nagent’s wealth at the end of period t serves as her endowment in t+ 1. In this setting, growth and inequality \narise endogenously allowing us to address new questions regarding their interplay and effect on cooperation. We find that amounts contributed are increasing over time even in the absence of punishment \npossibilities. Variation in wealth is substantial with the richest groups earning more than ten times what the \npoorest groups earn. Introducing the possibility of punishment does not increase wealth and in some cases \neven decreases it. In the presence of a punishment option, inequality in early periods is strongly negatively \ncorrelated with group income in later periods, highlighting negative interaction effects between endogenous \ninequality and punishment. \n© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license