DYNAMIC SCORING OF TAX REFORMS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
本文首次将微观模拟与动态一般均衡模型结合，对欧洲税收改革进行动态评分。以比利时社会保险缴费改革为例，发现降低雇主缴费的自筹资金效应远大于降低雇员缴费。
Abstract In this paper, we present the first dynamic scoring exercise linking a microsimulation and a dynamic general equilibrium model for Europe. We illustrate our novel methodology analyzing hypothetical reforms of the social insurance contributions system in Belgium. Our approach takes into account the feedback effects resulting from adjustments and behavioral responses in the labor market and the economy‐wide reaction to the tax policy changes essential for a comprehensive evaluation of the reforms. We find that the self‐financing effect of a reduction in employers’ social insurance contribution is substantially larger than that of a comparable reduction in employees’ social insurance contributions.