Evaluating Strategic Forecasters
研究了如何评估专业选举预测者，提出一个无转移支付的动态机制设计问题，最优确定性机制是评估单个最优时机的预测，并探讨了结果的普遍性和稳健性。
Motivated by the question of how one should evaluate professional election forecasters, we study a novel dynamic mechanism design problem without transfers. A principal who wishes to hire only high-quality forecasters is faced with an agent of unknown quality. The agent privately observes signals about a publicly observable future event, and may strategically misrepresent information to inflate the principal’s perception of his quality. We show that the optimal deterministic mechanism is simple and easy to implement in practice: it evaluates a single, optimally timed prediction. We study the generality of this result and its robustness to randomization and noncommitment.