Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality, and Incomplete Markets
在新凯恩斯基准模型中引入不完全市场下的异质性主体和有限理性（level-k思维），发现两者相互作用会大幅削弱货币政策效果，尤其长期效果更明显，为“前瞻指引之谜”提供了一种解释。
This paper extends the benchmark New-Keynesian model by introducing two frictions: (i) agent heterogeneity with incomplete markets, uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, and occasionally-binding borrowing constraints; and (ii) bounded rationality in the form of level-k thinking. Compared to the benchmark model, we show that the interaction of these two frictions leads to a powerful mitigation of the effects of monetary policy, which is more pronounced at long horizons, and offers a potential rationalization of the “forward guidance puzzle.” Each of these frictions, in isolation, would lead to no or much smaller departures from the benchmark model.