The Problem of Unilateralism in Agency Theory: Towards a Bilateral Formulation
本文批评代理理论中的单边主义，提出双边警示观点，通过讨论角色二元性和互惠规范，为逆向选择和道德风险问题提供道德解决方案，扩展了代理理论的规范边界。
ABSTRACT: Some business ethicists view agency theory as a cautionary tale—a proof that it is impossible to carry out successful economic interactions in the absence of ethical behaviour. The cautionary-tale view presents a nuanced normative characterisation of agency, but its unilateral focus betrays a limited understanding of the structure of social interaction. This article moves beyond unilateralism by presenting a descriptive and normative argument for a bilateral cautionary-tale view. Specifically, we discuss hat swaps and role dualism in asymmetric-information principal-agent relationships and argue that the norm of reciprocity can function as a moral solution to agency risks in adverse-selection and moral-hazard problems. Our bilateral cautionary-tale formulation extends the normative boundaries of agency theory, while leaving the fundamental economic assumptions of agency theory intact.