DOES CORRUPTION ATTENUATE THE EFFECT OF RED TAPE ON EXPORTS?
利用企业层面数据，研究发现腐败虽能通过贿赂减少海关延误，但总体上阻碍了企业进入出口市场，需权衡其双重效应。
I use firm ‐level data to examine whether corruption attenuates the adverse effects of red tape on exports. I find that, conditional on there being customs‐related red tape, a firm is better off if it can use bribes to lower the delay that it faces. However, I also find that corruption has a negative overall effect on a firm's decision to export. That is, corruption prevents some firms from entering the export market. These results suggest that to gauge the overall effect of corruption, we must compare its red‐tape attenuating effect with its adverse effect on a firm's decision to export.