Consistent climate policies
研究了当时间偏好偏离标准指数贴现且决策者无法承诺未来政策时，最优气候政策如何制定。发现时间递减贴现使气候影响的延迟和持续性成为政策制定者的承诺工具，量化了承诺价值，使排放税比基准提高20倍。
What are the optimal climate policies when time preferences deviate from the standard exponential discounting and decision makers cannot commit to future policies? We show that, with time-declining discounting, the delay and persistence of climate impacts provide a commitment device to policy makers. We quantify the commitment value in a climate-economy model by solving time-consistent Markov equilibrium capital and emission taxes explicitly. The returns on capital and climate investments are no longer equal, leading to a large increase in the emission tax, compared to a benchmark with equalized returns. The commitment value increases the tax by a factor of 20 in our quantitative assessment.