Director Tenure Diversity and Board Monitoring Effectiveness
研究发现董事任期多样性越高的董事会，CEO业绩与离职的关联越强；任期多样的审计委员会能减少会计重述，薪酬委员会则降低超额薪酬，但公司财务业绩并未显著提升。
Abstract This study examines the impact of director tenure diversity on board effectiveness. We find that tenure‐diverse boards exhibit significantly higher CEO performance‐turnover sensitivity and that firms with tenure‐diverse audit committees are less likely to experience accounting restatements. Furthermore, we document that tenure‐diverse compensation committees also award less excess compensation and are less likely to overcompensate. Even though tenure‐diverse boards seem to exhibit superior monitoring performance, there is limited evidence that their firms exhibit superior financial performance. The findings suggest that recent calls for board renewal, to the extent that it would increase tenure diversity rather than just decrease average board tenure, may help enhance board monitoring.