Contract Negotiation and the Coase Conjecture: A Strategic Foundation for Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
研究了当部分参与方拥有私人信息且谈判摩擦可忽略时合同谈判的形态，为重新谈判证明合同提供了理论基础，模型将科斯猜想扩展到内生决定交易数量或质量以及偏好不可分离的情形。
What does contract negotiation look like when some parties hold private information and negotiation frictions are negligible? This paper analyzes this question and provides a foundation for renegotiation-proof contracts in this environment. The model extends the framework of the Coase conjecture to situations in which the quantity or quality of the good is endogenously determined and to more general environments in which preferences are nonseparable in the traded goods. As frictions become negligible, all equilibria converge to a unique outcome which is separating, efficient, and straightforward to characterize.