Internal versus external CEO choice and the structure of compensation contracts
研究企业在选择CEO时面临的候选人筛选与薪酬设计双重问题，发现纯道德风险下最优合同是封顶奖金合同，而逆向选择时需加入股权；解释了CEO薪酬上涨、股权使用增加和外部招聘增多并存的现象。
Abstract Any firm choosing a chief executive officer (CEO) faces a double problem: candidate selection and choice of a compensation scheme. We derive sufficient conditions where the unique optimal compensation scheme is a capped-bonus contract in a pure moral-hazard environment, while equity is used when the firm also faces adverse selection. Then, we provide a rationale for the simultaneous increases in CEO pay, use of equity in compensation, and external hiring of CEOs. Our results are consistent with empirical evidence that shows externally hired CEOs earn more than those internally hired and that externally hired CEOs get a higher fraction of their compensation equity based.