Rationalizability of menu preferences
研究了在数据集不受限的一般情况下，如何通过底层备选偏好来理性化机会集（菜单）偏好，提出了关键的公理“覆盖支配”，并依赖于菜单偏好的传递性，但可放宽完备性。
The class of preferences over opportunity sets (“menus”) rationalizable by underlying preferences over the alternatives is characterized for the general case in which the dataset is unrestricted. In particular, both the universal set of alternatives and the domain of menus over which preferences are asserted by the decision maker are arbitrary. The key “Cover Dominance” axiom states that any menu strictly preferred to a collection of menus must be strictly preferred to any menu covered by the collection. The method of characterization relies upon transitivity of menu preferences, but completeness can be relaxed.