Optimal Allocation with Ex Post Verification and Limited Penalties
研究了多个代理人竞争一个奖品时，基于事后验证和有限惩罚的最优分配机制，发现代理人数量大时采用短名单随机分配，数量小时则限制报价范围并分配给最高报价者。
Several agents with privately known social values compete for a prize. The prize is allocated based on the claims of the agents, and the winner is subject to a limited penalty if he makes a false claim. If the number of agents is large, the optimal mechanism places all agents above a threshold onto a shortlist along with a fraction of agents below the threshold, and then allocates the prize to a random agent on the shortlist. When the number of agents is small, the optimal mechanism allocates the prize to the agent who makes the highest claim, but restricts the range of claims above and below.