Moral Hazard in Natural Disaster Insurance Markets: Empirical Evidence from Germany and the United States
研究利用德国和美国的调查数据，通过四种计量模型分析自然灾害保险中道德风险的存在性，发现道德风险并不显著，但可能存在逆向选择，对保险与减灾措施的联动有政策启示。
Moral hazard in natural disaster insurance markets results in policyholders preparing less, increasing the risk they face. However, moral hazard may not arise, due to high risk aversion or market context. We study the relationship between disaster risk reduction and insurance coverage to assess the presence of moral hazard for two different natural hazards, using four econometric models on survey data from Germany and the United States. The results show that moral hazard is absent. Nevertheless, adverse risk selection may be present. This has significant policy relevance such as opportunities for strengthening the link between insurance and risk reduction measures. <i></i>