Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
研究了信息发送者如何设计机制向已拥有私人信息的接收者披露信息，利用线性规划方法刻画最优披露策略，并给出完全披露、不披露和区间披露的最优条件。
An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I characterize optimal information disclosure and provide conditions under which full and no revelation are optimal. Assuming further that the sender's utility depends only on the sender's expected type, I provide conditions under which interval revelation is optimal. Finally, I show that the expected utilities are not monotonic in the precision of the receiver's private information.