Designing a Simple Loss Function for Central Banks: Does a Dual Mandate Make Sense?
研究中央银行应如何设计简单的损失函数作为社会福利的近似，发现双重使命合理，且经济活动权重应很高，有时甚至超过通胀权重。
Abstract Yes, a dual mandate makes a lot of sense. This article studies how to design simple loss functions for central banks, as parsimonious approximations to social welfare. We show, both analytically and quantitatively, that simple loss functions should feature a high weight on measures of economic activity, sometimes even larger than the weight on inflation. Two main factors drive our result. First, stabilising economic activity also stabilises other welfare-relevant variables. Second, the estimated model features mitigated inflation distortions due to a low elasticity of substitution between monopolistic goods and a low interest rate sensitivity of demand. The result holds up in the presence of measurement errors, with large shocks that generate a trade-off between stabilising inflation and resource utilisation, and also when imposing a moderate degree of interest rate volatility.