Ownership Structure, Voting, and Risk
研究了当风险决策由风险规避的股东多数投票决定时，企业所有权结构的决定因素，解释了为何许多公司存在多个大股东，并提出了关于所有权结构与风险选择之间关系的实证含义。
We analyze the determinants of a firm's ownership structure when decisions over risk are taken by majority vote of risk-averse shareholders. We show that when a fraction of small, diversified shareholders abstains from voting, mid-sized blockholders may emerge to mitigate the conflict of interests between one large shareholder, who prefers less risky investments, and these small, non-voting shareholders. The paper offers a novel explanation for the puzzling observation that many firms have multiple blockholders. The paper develops numerous empirical implications, for example on the link between ownership structure and risk choices and on the relative size of blocks.