Incomplete Information Games with Ambiguity Averse Players
研究了参与者厌恶模糊性时不完全信息博弈的均衡概念，发现序贯最优性等价于用贝叶斯更新推广后的信念更新，且模糊厌恶扩大了均衡集，并展示了新的策略行为。
We study incomplete information games with ambiguity averse players. Our focus is on equilibrium concepts satisfying sequential optimality—each player’s strategy is optimal at each information set given opponents’ strategies. We show sequential optimality, which does not make any explicit assumption on updating, is equivalent to sequential optimality with respect to beliefs updated using a particular generalization of Bayesian updating. Ambiguity aversion expands the set of equilibria compatible with players sharing common ambiguous beliefs. We connect ambiguity aversion with belief robustness. Examples illustrate new strategic behavior, including strategic use of ambiguity, under ambiguity aversion.