Informational Frictions and the Credit Crunch
研究了2007-2009年金融危机期间，信息摩擦如何限制信贷向企业重新配置，发现其规模太小，不足以解释美国银团贷款市场的信贷紧缩。
ABSTRACT In this paper, I estimate the magnitude of an informational friction limiting credit reallocation to firms during the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis. Because lenders rely on private information when deciding which relationship to end, borrowers looking for a new lender are adversely selected. I show how to separately identify private information from information common to all lenders but unobservable to the econometrician by using bank shocks within a discrete choice model of relationships. Quantitatively, these informational frictions appear to be too small to explain the credit crunch in the U.S. syndicated corporate loan market.