Communication and cooperation in repeated games
研究了私人监控重复博弈中沟通的作用，发现无沟通时均衡收益受限于单次博弈的ε-粗相关均衡，而廉价谈话能实现接近高效的收益，表明沟通是合作的关键。
We study the role of communication in repeated games with private monitoring. We first show that without communication, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in such games is a subset of the set of ε ‐coarse correlated equilibrium payoffs ( ε ‐CCE) of the underlying one‐shot game. The value of ε depends on the discount factor and the quality of monitoring. We then identify conditions under which there are equilibria with “cheap talk” that result in nearly efficient payoffs outside the set ε ‐CCE. Thus, in our model, communication is necessary for cooperation.