Political advisers in Portugal: Partisanship and loyalty in policy processes
通过分析葡萄牙部长私人办公室的任命数据，研究政治顾问何时及为何被聘用，发现执政党借此注入党派性和忠诚度以合法化政策选择，并应对行政协调问题。
This article aims to contribute to the current debate regarding the role of political advisers in Portugal. It does so by empirically analysing appointments to positions within ministers’ private offices, specifying when and why such advice is sought and accepted by ministers. Multivariate analysis is complemented with elite perspectives on the roles of ministerial advisers. Results suggest that parties in government appoint political advisers to ministers’ private offices as a strategy to legitimize policy choices and instruments, by injecting partisanship, responsiveness and loyalty in the policy‐making process. Politicizing these positions is also a valuable asset for politicians given the procedural‐oriented, and the inter‐sector and inter‐service coordination problems within a heavy administrative structure, such as the Portuguese one. The use of this mechanism depends on the capacity of opposition parties to constrain incumbents’ control over such appointments.