Regional Headquarter’s Dual Agency Role: Micro‐political Strategies of Alignment and Self‐interest
研究了跨国公司中区域总部如何运用微观政治策略，既作为委托人寻求与公司总部对齐，又作为代理人追求自身利益，对理解跨国企业内部政治互动有参考价值。
The increased research focus on the networked perspective of the multinational enterprise (MNE) reflects a greater delegation of responsibility from corporate headquarters (CHQ) to subsidiary and intermediary units such as regional headquarters (RHQ). This shift has increased the intensity of political interactions between key actors within the MNE. Despite the recent rise in studies on the micro‐political perspective of the MNE to date, little empirical work has explored this issue in the context of the CHQ–RHQ relationship. Drawing insights from agency theory and micro‐politics, the authors focus on the context in which RHQs develop micro‐political strategies in order to manage the flow and exchange of knowledge with CHQ. They show how RHQ may exhibit a ‘dual agency’ role when dealing with CHQ, in that it is characterized as a principal and agent, each requiring different micro‐political knowledge strategies. As a principal, RHQ will develop micro‐political knowledge strategies to increase alignment with CHQ. As an agent, RHQ develops micro‐political knowledge strategies to pursue its self‐interests. Having identified different RHQ agency roles, the authors develop a conceptual model that outlines how alignment and self‐interest‐seeking behaviours from RHQ are manifest through different micro‐political knowledge strategies in its agency relationship with CHQ.