软承诺、提醒与学业表现

Soft Commitments, Reminders, and Academic Performance

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · 2019
被引 58
人大 A-ABS 4

中文导读

通过实地实验发现,软承诺(非约束性协议)能显著提高学生注册、参加和通过考试的概率,而单纯提醒无效,且拖延者受益最大。

Abstract

We provide first evidence that a soft commitment device enhances progress in education and, more generally, improves the completion of complex tasks—such as passing exams. In our field experiment, students can sign a nonbinding agreement and commit to staying on track for graduation. We find that those who were offered the soft commitment device are more likely to sign up for, take part in, and pass exams. A pure reminder treatment does not change behavior, which suggests that the effects are not driven by increased salience. We also show that procrastinators benefit most from the commitment device.

软承诺提醒学业表现拖延行为