Why Do Firms Use Insurance to Fund Worker Health Benefits? The Role of Corporate Finance
研究了企业为何选择购买保险而非自保来应对员工健康福利支付风险，发现小企业、投资机会多及面临凸性税制的企业更倾向使用保险，并权衡融资特征与监管成本。
Abstract When a firm offers health benefits to workers, it exposes the firm to the risk of making payments when workers get sick. A firm can either pay health expenses out of its general assets, keeping the risk inside the firm, or it can purchase insurance, shifting the risk outside the firm. Using data on insurance decisions, we find that smaller firms, firms with more investment opportunities, and firms that face a convex tax schedule are more likely to hedge the risk of health benefit payments. We show how firms trade off the benefits that come from financing and investment characteristics with the costs of regulation when choosing insurance. We provide understanding of how firms’ policy and financial characteristics affect firm outcomes as the Affordable Care Act provisions impacting plan funding continue to evolve.