Managerial Discretion in Accruals and Informational Efficiency
研究发现，管理层对应计项目的自由裁量权（以异常应计的绝对值衡量）越大，未来12个月股价偏离随机游走的程度越小，即信息效率越高，表明自由裁量应计总体上向投资者传递了有用信息。
Abstract In this paper, we examine the relation between managerial discretion in accruals and informational efficiency. We measure managerial discretion in accruals by the absolute value of abnormal accruals. Assuming that efficient prices follow a random walk, we measure informational efficiency by using stock return variance ratios. We find that the absolute value of abnormal accruals is negatively associated with the price deviation from a random walk pattern, estimated in the 12‐month period subsequent to the accrual reporting; hence, future informational efficiency increases with the extent to which managers exercise discretion over accruals. The results are consistent with the view that discretionary accruals, on average, convey useful information to investors and facilitate the price convergence to its fundamental value. Our findings are robust to a battery of tests, including tests to validate both our measures of informational efficiency and our measure of managerial discretion in accruals.