Why Do Firms Disagree with Short Sellers? Managerial Myopia versus Private Information
研究发现，企业在卖空增加时回购股票，并非出于管理短视或代理问题，而是基于管理者的私人信息；基于此的交易策略年化收益达7.5%。
Though short sellers on average succeed at identifying overvalued equity, firms often signal disagreement with short sellers by repurchasing stock when short interest increases. We investigate whether this disagreement reflects a myopic defense of inflated prices, or positive private information. These repurchases appear motivated by managers’ private information, not agency issues, even when managerial benefits to short-termism are enhanced or monitoring is weaker. Managers’ informational advantage relates to subsequent news, earnings, and risk, but is attenuated if activists target management or insiders sell. A trading strategy based on our findings earns 7.5% annually.